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133 
LOST IN TRANSLATION: THE ACCIDENTAL 
ORIGINS OF BOND V. UNITED STATES 
Kevin L. Cope* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the unusual features of cases about the constitutionality of 
federal statutes is that they are nearly always foreseeable. Even before the 
bill’s introduction in Congress, lawmakers are often aware that they are 
inviting a federal lawsuit. Anticipating a legal challenge, legislators and their 
staffs attempt to predict the courts’ views of the statute and adapt the bill 
accordingly.1 Generally speaking, the bigger the bill’s potential constitutional 
impact, the more foreseeable the resulting case. By this logic, jurists should 
have seen the constitutional issues in Bond v. United States2 from a mile 
away. In reality, they were foreseen by virtually no one. 
Bond addresses the constitutionality of a high-profile act of Congress, 
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
(hereinafter the “Act” or the “Implementation Act”).3 The Act domesticizes 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”), a global treaty concluded in 
1993, which the United States joined four years later.4 The CWC is expressly 
aimed at stopping the development, stockpiling, and deployment of chemical 
weapons of mass destruction. The Act’s application in Bond tests the limits 
of Congress’s power to implement treaties that encroach on traditional state 
prerogatives. The specific question before the Court is whether the Necessary 
 
 *  Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank 
Adam Chilton, Tom Ginsburg, Andrew Hayashi, Duncan Hollis, David Koplow, Eric Posner, 
Pierre-Hughes Verdier, Mila Versteeg, and David Sloss for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of the Essay. 
 1. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001), invalidated in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd-
2000dd-1 (2006), invalidated in part by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 2. Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (S. Ct. argued Nov. 5, 2013). 
 3. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229 
(1998). 
 4. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 112 Stat. 2681–856, 1974 
U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter CWC]. 
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and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Missouri v. Holland allow 
Congress to penalize “local” conduct not within any of its enumerated 
powers—and in fact quintessentially within the states’ police powers—when 
it is implementing a valid treaty.5 
Both parties and numerous amici now seem to believe that the case 
could transform key parts of federalism doctrine and/or the United States’ 
ability to make treaty commitments.6 Yet despite the plethora of legal 
expertise in Congress and the executive branch, no one seemed aware of 
these issues until Bond’s attorneys raised them before a federal district court 
in 2007. Given Bond’s grand, disarmament-treaty origins, that oversight will 
probably trouble anyone interested in the growing role of international law7 
in the U.S. federal legal system. 
Much has been written about how Bond should be decided and how its 
outcome could shape constitutional law and U.S. foreign relations. This 
Essay instead looks backward, exploring the strange roots of Bond and what 
those origins say about the process by which the United States converts 
treaties into federal law. The Essay suggests that the reason that Bond—and 
its implications for treaties and federalism— took so many by surprise lies in 
the incentives inherent in the arcane art of translating international law into 
domestic law. In that sense, Bond is a cautionary tale for future treaty-
implementation efforts. 
I. The Background of Bond: The Chemical Weapons Convention 
The prosecution that triggered the case began in 2007, nine years after 
Congress implemented the CWC by passing the Implementation Act. A 42-
year-old suburban Philadelphia woman named Carol Anne Bond rubbed 
two abrasive chemicals (one of which she took from her workplace, the other 
 
 5. Before the district court, the government disavowed reliance on the Commerce 
Clause. In the Third Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court, however, the government 
raised a Commerce Clause argument, although the court declined to consider it. See United 
States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 162 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012) (declining to address government’s 
“newly-discovered” argument in light of the court’s holding under the treaty power and 
Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 6. See, e.g., Brief for Profs. David M. Golove, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 4, Bond, (No. 12-158) (“[T]he Nation’s ability to make treaties would be severely 
compromised if the President were unable to assure treaty partners that the national 
government has the power to enforce its promises.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 390, 397 (1998) (“Because treaties now regulate matters that countries traditionally have 
considered internal, there is an increasing likelihood of overlap, and conflict, with domestic 
law.”). 
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she ordered on Amazon.com) on the mailbox and car door of her friend 
Myrlinda Haynes. Bond had recently learned that Haynes was pregnant and 
that Bond’s husband was the father. On one occasion, some chemicals 
rubbed off on Haynes’s hand and she suffered a minor thumb burn. When 
Haynes told the police, local officials declined to pursue the matter, believing 
the substance to be some form of cocaine. 
The whole incident might have ended there, but because a mailbox was 
involved, eventually so, too, was the U.S. Postal Service. To the surprise of 
almost everyone, federal prosecutors in Philadelphia stepped in and charged 
Bond under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. The 
charged offense carried a maximum sentence of life in federal prison. 
Anyone who might have “harbored” Bond with knowledge of her actions 
faced a potential ten-year term. 
Those bizarre events directly triggered the Bond prosecution, but the 
case’s real origins trace back fourteen years earlier to 1993, when the CWC 
was adopted. According to the CWC’s preamble, its purpose is to achieve 
“the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction” 
and, “for the sake of all mankind,” to effect “the complete and effective 
prohibition of the development, . . . stockpiling, . . . transfer and use of 
chemical weapons.” 
In implementing the CWC, Congress and the State Department 
appeared to be singularly focused on global security. In explaining the 
CWC’s purpose to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the director 
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency began by noting that 
“[s]topping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is at the very 
top of President Clinton’s foreign policy agenda.” The director characterized 
the CWC as “both a disarmament and a nonproliferation Treaty,” which 
“establishes an unprecedented global norm against chemical weapons” that 
would eventually help to “eliminate this serious threat to our country and to 
world peace.”8 Secretary of State Christopher testified that the Convention 
“promises to eliminate a scourge [i.e., chemical weapons] that has hung over 
the world for almost 80 years.”9 
Those statements may characterize the CWC’s purpose, but, as Bond has 
proved, they may not reflect its actual effect on U.S. law. Despite this focus 
on global security and weapons of mass destruction, the text of both the 
CWC and the Act arguably sweep far more broadly—and locally. The CWC 
requires each state party to stop the prohibited use of chemical weapons 
within its jurisdiction. Those prohibitions mean that a state and its subjects 
 
 8. Chemical Weapons Convention: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
103d Cong. 11 (1994) (statement of Hon. John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency). 
 9. Id. (statement of Warren Christopher, Secretary of State). 
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may not “use,” “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain 
chemical weapons.” “Chemical weapons” are defined in part as “[t]oxic 
chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention.” And “toxic chemical” means “[a]ny 
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.” 
Purposes “not prohibited” include “[i]ndustrial, agricultural, research, 
medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.” It seems clear that the 
treaty drafters envisioned that state parties would prohibit the use of all toxic 
chemicals and their precursors (unless they are used for purposes “not 
prohibited”).10 Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the drafters were 
concerned with Bond-like uses, that is, minor, non-politically-motivated 
assaults with otherwise legal chemicals that are harmful only when used off 
label. Thus, although there is little reason to believe that the CWC drafters 
intended it, the CWC’s language arguably requires state parties to 
criminalize all non-”peaceful” chemical uses not just of traditional chemical 
weapons and potential weapons, but of many household chemicals as well. 
II. The Chemical Weapons Convention’s U.S. Implementation 
The United States may have unknowingly succeeded in creating just 
such a criminal regime. The Act copies most of the CWC’s key provisions 
verbatim. In essence, any chemical that can potentially cause any 
“permanent harm” and is used for anything other than a “peaceful purpose” 
is a “chemical weapon.” It is a violation of the Act knowingly to, among 
other things, possess that “weapon,” threaten to use it, or actually use it. This 
formulation led Justice Alito to suggest that “pouring a bottle of vinegar in 
[a] friend’s goldfish bowl” might be punishable under the Act.11 The Third 
Circuit noted that the Act’s breadth was “striking,” “turn[ing] each kitchen 
cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a potential chemical 
weapons cache.”12 
 
 10. See Brief of Amici Curiae Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiators and Experts 
in Support of Respondent at 8, Bond, (No. 12-158) (stating that the negotiators considered a 
broad prohibition “necessary to avoid proliferation of chemical weapons to those who might 
use them improperly and to prevent the development, manufacture or stockpiling of chemical 
weapons under the guise of commercial activity”). 
 11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bond, (No. 09-1227) (S. Ct. Feb. 22, 2011) (Alito, 
J.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-
1227.pdf. 
 12. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 154 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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The government has not distanced itself from that interpretation; in fact, 
it now appears to have embraced it. Before lower federal courts and the 
Supreme Court, Justice Department attorneys argued not only that the U.S. 
Constitution gives it the authority to prosecute Bond but that international 
law and foreign-relations considerations also effectively demand that power. 
The government insisted that if the United States could not prosecute the 
likes of Bond under the Act because “local” cases were outside the Act’s 
domain, it “would hamstring U.S. treaty negotiators” and “undermine global 
confidence in the United States as a reliable treaty partner, to the detriment 
of the foreign policy and national security of the United States.” 
During the CWC’s ratification and its implementation, these grave 
concerns about the law’s effective scope apparently concerned no one—not 
in the Justice Department, the State Department, or in Congress. People 
regularly use chemicals to injure. But neither the congressional debates nor 
the testimony by State Department officials and other experts suggested that 
the Act could be used for purposes other than preventing chemical warfare 
and terrorism, much less prosecutions of routine assaults.13 In fact, Congress 
ostensibly envisioned that only the most egregious criminal acts would 
violate the CWC’s implementing legislation. As the Senate committee that 
recommended consenting to ratification noted, the then-proposed penalties 
for “knowingly engag[ing] in prohibited [chemical weapons]–related 
activities”—even those falling short of “actual use”—included life in prison.14 
Moreover, the legal concepts that would become central to Bond—the 
scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the correct reading of 
Missouri v. Holland—were never raised publicly, either by legal expert 
committee witnesses, by members of Congress, or by executive officials.15 
The single congressional hearing dedicated to the Act’s constitutionality 
focused on unrelated issues: the propriety of allowing an international treaty 
compliance officer to exercise the authority of a U.S. officer and how 
mandatory inspections of private property would implicate the Fourth 
 
 13. See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Implementing Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997); Constitutional Implications of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 14. S. EXEC. REP NO. 104-33, at 210 (1996) (report of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations). 
 15. Of course, it is possible that participants in the implementation process noted 
privately that the Act’s comprehensive language could theoretically lead to routine, Bond-like 
prosecutions, i.e., those involving no federal or international interests. They may have 
assumed, however, that judicious prosecutorial discretion would confine prosecutions under 
the Act to those implicating the instruments’ stated focuses: weapons of mass destruction, 
arms control, terrorism, and other issues relevant to national or global security. In that case, 
they may have focused their political capital on higher priority constitutional, foreign-policy, 
and security issues. 
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Amendment.16 If anyone had closely read the Act’s language and anticipated 
that it would cause Bond-like prosecutions, surely some states’ rights–
minded member of Congress would have sounded the alarm and asked an 
executive official whether the CWC or the Act might be used to displace 
state-law criminal regimes. No one so much as hinted at that possibility. 
III. An International-to-Domestic-Law Mistranslation 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bond could significantly curtail the 
scope of Congress’s foreign-relations power or expand its power to regulate 
local conduct. As to the foreign-relations effect, the government and others 
have argued that were the country’s ability to implement some treaties 
limited by domestic constitutional constraints, these constraints could 
undermine the credibility of its international agreements and frustrate the 
president’s ability to make such commitments in the first place. 
As to the scope of congressional power, a decision for the government 
on broad grounds could open the door to additional federal regulation in 
areas (some of which the states may be regulating adequately) that lie outside 
Congress’s enumerated powers. With Bond, the United States already 
complied with large portions of the treaty through its state criminal regimes: 
no one has suggested that Pennsylvania or any other state has a generally 
dysfunctional criminal system as to chemical batteries (even if local officials 
misjudged this case). The Act—unlike the statute in Holland—seeks to 
regulate an area of traditional state expertise that the states are eager to 
handle themselves.17 If Congress can legislate in these areas, it arguably 
pushes the line established in Holland back a bit further. 
One explanation for why no one involved in the CWC or the Act 
anticipated these issues lies in the incentives facing nation-states 
implementing treaties. Not surprisingly, the treaty’s foreign drafters were not 
experts on U.S. federalism. By contrast, State Department lawyers and many 
congressional staff are. But, perhaps erring on the side of caution, Congress 
 
 16. Chemical Weapons Convention: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
103d Cong. (1994) (statement of John Yoo). 
 17. A critical but often overlooked element of the Holland decision is that the federal 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act was probably the only way for the United States to comply with the 
treaty. Missouri resisted the entire purpose of the treaty, and it zealously defended the 
unfettered right of its citizens to hunt the birds. That opposition was probably a key reason 
that the statute was deemed constitutional; in the face of Missouri’s defiance, the statute was 
“necessary” to accomplish the federal objective. Given Pennsylvania’s functional criminal-legal 
regime and the state’s general willingness to prosecute assaults (albeit not in this case), the 
same cannot be said about the Act’s application in Bond. 
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chose to copy the CWC’s key language largely verbatim, with no public 
mention of those words’ consequences for federalism. 
This phenomenon might be described as a “teach-to-the-test” effect. 
U.S. public school teachers are incentivized to “translate” as closely as 
possible the state-approved curriculum into their class lesson plans. A 
teacher who does so is likely to see her students’ scores rise, which will 
improve her personal evaluations. If the standard curriculum turns out to be 
pedagogically deficient, her costs are few: the bureaucracy, not the teacher, is 
blamed. She is unlikely to realize many substantive benefits from a more 
creative approach. Conversely, if she strays from the standard material and 
her students perform poorly, she’s likely to be held responsible. 
A similar effect may be at work when Congress implements 
international agreements like the CWC. Congressional drafters have little to 
gain by developing creative approaches to fulfill those agreements. If they 
play it safe and simply import the CWC’s language, they can rest assured 
knowing they have covered all their international-law bases. Any negative 
domestic consequences can be blamed on the treaty itself, on other members 
of Congress for not inserting reservations (although the CWC itself prohibits 
them), or on the president for signing the treaty in the first place. These 
incentives should tend to produce literal translations from the international 
law to the domestic law. 
In most other cases, Congress is attentive to the federalism implications 
of multilateral treaties: consider the roadblocks faced by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
These treaties all require state parties to prohibit behaviors that are often 
within the traditional purview of U.S. states, e.g., child neglect, criminal 
punishment, and state-government procurement. Each treaty lingered for 
years or was stymied altogether, largely because of federalism concerns.18 
The CWC is unusual in this respect. To the extent that it threatens 
current federalism norms, it has proved a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Like these 
treaties, the CWC requires its members to prohibit certain conduct by its 
citizens. But that conduct is qualitatively different because the CWC 
purports to address a prototypical national and international concern: the 
development and stockpiling of weapons of war. The CWC is ostensibly 
aimed at states and terrorists, with the outward goal of promoting 
international peace and security. That outward objective may have distracted 
lawmakers implementing the CWC from its elements that, like similar 
elements in controversial human rights treaties, can reach into domestic and 
 
 18. See Robert Anderson IV, “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The Treaty Power at the 
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 237 (2001). 
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local affairs and that have nothing to do with international peace and 
security. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever Bond’s outcome, the Act’s congressional drafters may have 
accidentally laid the groundwork for a watershed in federal–state relations 
and, perhaps, in U.S. foreign relations. If this case, with these several 
important implications, has taken its creators by surprise, why does its 
strange origin matter to anyone besides Carol Bond? It matters because the 
case underscores the dangers of poorly translating international law into 
domestic law, particularly given the complexities of federalism. Congress’s 
attempt to minimize “translation errors” by copying pertinent phrases 
verbatim may dot all the “i’s” and cross all the “t’s,” but it can compromise 
the spirit, or true purpose, of the international law. This verbatim translation 
can distort the effect of the statute when courts—which usually look first to 
statutes’ plain language—interpret the law. As with crude language-
translation software, the overarching purpose of the language is lost to 
literalism. 
In the realm of treaty interpretation, this process can produce 
unforeseen, unintended consequences. Here, the overly literal translation of 
international law has created a law that turns many kitchen cupboards into 
“potential chemical weapons cache[s].” The result is predictable: a criminal 
regime that punishes routine, misdemeanor batterers as if they were 
terrorists and illegal-arms dealers, a consequence unlikely to find much 
support regardless of political or legal ideology. Given the expanding scope 
of issues subject to multilateral treaties in recent years,19 these unintended 
domestic effects might well become increasingly commonplace, especially 
where they come packaged as international security or trade conventions. 
That result is hardly inevitable. For instance, the CWC, like many other 
treaties, acknowledges that each state party shall implement its obligations 
under the Convention “in accordance with its constitutional 
processes.”20Had Congress foreseen that federal prosecutors would use the 
Act to pursue people like Carol Bond, it might have found other ways, “in 
accordance with [U.S.] constitutional processes,” to fulfill its obligation to 
 
 19. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 397; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1869–70 (2005) (arguing that affording Congress a broad 
treaty-implementation power is troubling, especially given the “explosion of the United States’s 
commitments under international law”). 
 20. CWC art. VII, Jan. 13, 1993, 112 Stat. 2681–856, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
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prohibit nonpeaceful chemical uses. For instance, Congress could have 
simply created a multitiered sentencing scheme, in which minor assaults 
were recognized and punished as such. Alternatively, Congress could have 
relied on existing U.S. state criminal regimes to cover nonpeaceful uses of 
chemicals (as in Bond) that have nothing to do with international peace, 
terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction. For example, prior to the Act, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 prohibited the use of 
chemical weapons. But it defined “chemical weapon” more narrowly, as “a 
weapon that is designed or intended to cause widespread death or serious 
bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or 
poisonous chemicals or precursors of toxic or poisonous chemicals.” That 
definition, in conjunction with the existing state schemes, would also have 
fulfilled the pertinent U.S. obligations under the CWC. 
If it acknowledges the lessons of the CWC and Bond, a future Congress 
might look for alternative, more creative ways to implement U.S. treaties. 
From an international-law standpoint, those alternatives would certainly be 
bolder, perhaps even riskier. But by depriving the Supreme Court of the 
chance to reshape foreign-relations federalism in ways that could hamstring 
the other branches, the alternatives are more likely to serve the political and 
foreign-affairs interests of Congress and the president. 
That the issues raised in Bond surprised Congress and so many others 
demonstrates the challenges of converting international law into domestic 
law in a federal system. Above all, Bond’s history shows how the 
implementation process can force lawmakers into the tricky task of 
navigating between two ills: straying too far from a convention’s sweeping 
directives, which risks breaching international law, and producing uncritical 
literal translations of those directives, which risks importing a domestic 
regime poorly suited for a domestic system. 
 
